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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Paul J. Cavanaugh appeals from the district court's order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief. Mr. Cavanaugh asserts that the district court erred 
when it concluded that there was not a disputed issue of material fact with respect to his 
allegation that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in voir dire. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Following a jury trial, Paul J. Cavanaugh was found guilty of vehicular 
manslaughter and leaving the scene of an injury accident. Mr. Cavanaugh was 
sentenced to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with eight years fixed, for the vehicular 
manslaughter charge and a concurrent fixed sentence of five years for the leaving the 
scene of an injury accident charge. State v. Cavanaugh, Docket No. 37705 (Ct. App. 
October 26, 2011) (unpublished) (hereinafter, Cavanaugh /). Mr. Cavanaugh has twice 
lost on direct appeal, first from the denial of a motion for new trial on a claim of newly 
discovered evidence, and then on direct appeal from the conviction itself. 1 State v. 
Cavanaugh, Docket No. 33657 (Ct. App. February 10, 2009) (unpublished); Cavanaugh 
I. 
Following Cavanaugh I, Mr. Cavanaugh filed a verified petition for post-conviction 
relief, supported by nearly two hundred pages of exhibits, asserting a dozen claims of 
1 His direct appeal from the judgment of conviction in Cavanaugh I occurred several 
years after trial, and resulted from the district court granting his request for post-
conviction relief in the form of a restoration of his right to appeal after his trial counsel 
failed to file a notice of appeal despite Mr. Cavanaugh's request. (R., pp.325-27.) 
1 
ineffective assistance of counsel.2 (R., pp.4-60.) Among those claims was one 
challenging his attorney's failure to exclude several jurors, including juror R.H .. 3 
(R., pp.36-38.) 
With respect to juror R.H., Mr. Cavanaugh emphasized juror R.H.'s colloquy with 
the court concerning his familiarity with the victim and at least one witness. (R., pp.36-
37.) That colloquy is as follows: 
THE COURT: And do you know something about this case or have 
you read something about this case? 
A. I did. Where I work is just a short distance on this particular road 
from the event. Yes. My daughter worked with Sara [the victim]. I know 
one of the individuals they intend on calling as a witness. Do I think that I 
could judge fairly? Yes. But I don't know. I - what I've heard here by the 
prosecuting attorney and the defense attorney already today has changed 
my vision of what I believed happened so .... 
THE COURT: Knowing - or having heard about this case, do you 
feel that you could set aside what you've heard about this case and decide 
the case based solely upon the evidence that's presented during the 
course of this trial? 
A. I believe that I could. 
THE COURT: And with regard to the individuals that you know of 
who may be a witness in this case or witnesses, do you feel that you 
would give that person or persons greater weight than you would 
someone else? Or lesser weight? Either one. 
A. I- it would- I would say greater weight. Yes. Probably. 
THE COURT: Would this knowledge prevent you from acting with 
impartiality in this case. 
A. I don't believe so. Like I said, I - what I - the knowledge that I had 
until today has already been changed by what I have seen here. 
2 Although Mr. Cavanaugh's petition for post-conviction relief raised at least a dozen 
issues, he appeals only from the denial of his voir dire claim. 
3 On appeal, Mr. Cavanaugh only challenges the district court's dismissal of the claim 






Any other questions that you would have responded 
Thank you very much. 
A. Well, only that one question that I do - / do know personally one of 
the individuals that you intend on calling and my daughter worked with 
Sara at Stoneridge Resort. I did not know Sara. I work with people who 
did know her. All right. And this happened close to where I work. 
THE COURT: 
information. 
Thank you very much for providing us with that 
(R., pp.119-20 (ellipsis in original) (emphases added).) 
Defense counsel did not move to strike juror R.H. for cause (See R., pp.119-20), 
and he did not exercise all of his peremptory challenges, and juror R.H. was seated as a 
member of the jury. (R., p.132.) In his petition, Mr. Cavanaugh argued that there was 
no good reason to explain his attorney's failure to "pre-empt the most prejudiced juror 
mentioned." (R., p.37.) 
In addition to filing an Answer (R., pp.223-43), the State filed a Motion for 
Summary Dismissal as to all claims except Mr. Cavanaugh's claim that his attorney was 
ineffective in failing to file a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., pp.251-70.) 
The district court then issued an Order Finding Ineffective Assistance of Trial 
Counsel and Order Permitting Filing of Appeal along with an Order Granting Summary 
Dismissal of Remaining Claims. (R., pp.325-332.) In summarily dismissing his 
remaining claims, the district court announced, 
To survive the State's motion, Mr. Cavanaugh must establish that there 
are material issues of fact which preclude the granting of the motion for 
summary dismissal. There has been no showing that his lawyers' actions 
3 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. There has been an 
inadequate showing that the conduct of his lawyers so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied 
upon as having produced a just result. The petition and other documents 
submitted by Mr. Cavanaugh, together with his argument at the hearing, 
failed to show that his trial counsel were ineffective before trial, during trial, 
and/or at sentencing, and that there is a reasonable probability that but for 
the conduct of his counsel, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. 
(R., p.332.) 
Mr. Cavanaugh filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order 
Granting Summary Dismissal of Remaining Claims. (R., p.334.) 
4 
ISSUE 




The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Cavanaugh's Post-Conviction Claim 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Cavanaugh's claim that 
he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to exercise his 
final peremptory challenge to exclude juror R.H. He contends that the district court 
erred in finding, at the summary judgment stage, that failing to do so did not constitute 
deficient performance, and when it found that, assuming it was deficient, there was no 
prejudice shown. 
B. Standards Of Review 
1. Summary Dismissal 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. 
The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the 
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by 
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case 
where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 
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145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to 
petition) (citing Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) (addressing 
case with stipulated facts)). However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required 
to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept 
the petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue 
of fact exists. I .C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145 
Idaho 148, 153 (2008). At the summary dismissal stage the petitioner need only 
present prima facie evidence of both prongs. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 
(2010). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
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2. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
8 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Cavanaugh's Post-
Conviction Claim 
In its order summarily dismissing all but one of Mr. Cavanaugh's claims, 4 the 
district court, addressing them generally, wrote: 
To survive the State's motion, Mr. Cavanaugh must establish that there 
are material issues of fact which preclude the granting of the motion for 
summary dismissal. There has been no showing that his lawyers' actions 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. There has been an 
inadequate showing that the conduct of his lawyers so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied 
upon as having produced a just result. The petition and other documents 
submitted by Mr. Cavanaugh, together with his argument at the hearing, 
failed to show that his trial counsel were ineffective before trial, during trial, 
and/or at sentencing, and that there is a reasonable probability that but for 
the conduct of his counsel, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. 
(R., p.332.) 
4 As noted above, the district court did grant Mr. Cavanaugh's claim concerning his 
attorney's failure to file a notice of appeal. 
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With respect to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in decisions made 
during jury selection, this Court has held that such claims will not be second guessed 
unless a petitioner demonstrates that such a decision was "made upon the basis of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation." State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425, 427 (1976) (internal quotation 
marks and footnote omitted). 
Mr. Cavanaugh presented unrebutted evidence that his attorney failed to strike a 
juror who admitted that he would be biased in favor of one of the witnesses. That juror 
ended up serving on the jury that convicted him. (R., pp.119-20, 132.) This certainly 
represented a prima facie case for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that 
entitled Mr. Cavanaugh to a hearing on the issue. See McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 
571 (2010) (to survive summary dismissal motion, petitioner need only make a prima 
facie showing as to claim). 
At an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Cavanaugh's former attorney could be examined 
to determine what reason he had for failing to exercise his final peremptory challenge to 
strike juror R.H. His testimony could then be evaluated to determine whether his reason 
represented a "shortcoming[] capable of objective evaluation." Because Mr. Cavanaugh 
made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court erred 
when it summarily dismissed his post-conviction claim. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Cavanaugh respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the district court's order dismissing his post-conviction petition as to the 
claim raised in this appeal, and remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing on that 
claim. 
DATED this 2nd day of April, 2012. 
eputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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